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Both China and India, the emerging giants in Asia, have achieved significant economic 
development in recent years. China has enjoyed a high annual GDP growth rate of 10 per cent 
and India has achieved an annual GDP growth rate of 6 per cent since 1981. Decomposing 
China and India’s GDP growth from 1981 to 2004 into the three factors’ contribution reveals 
that technology has contributed significantly to both countries’ GDP growth, especially in the 
1990s. R&D outputs (high-tech exports, service exports, and certified patents from USPTO) and 
inputs (R&D expenditure and human resources) further indicate that both countries have been 
very committed to R&D and their output is quite efficient. 
Both governments have played an essential role in transforming their national innovation 
systems so that they can be more adaptable to economic development. The main focus of their 
reforms has been to link the science sector with the business sector and to provide incentives for 
innovation activities. Balancing import of technology and indigenous R&D effort is another 
major theme. Innovation capability development has become more and more critical to the 
success of biofirms in India and China. Institutional factors have great influence on choice of 
innovation at the firm level, i.e., the decision at firm level in terms of indigenous R&D or 
import of technology. Nevertheless, limited financial resources and insufficiently qualified 
human resources remain two major challenges for domestic companies in both countries.  
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1 Introduction 
China and India, the two emerging giants in Asia, have achieved impressive economic 
growth since the beginning of 1980s. From 1981 to 2004, China enjoyed a high annual 
GDP growth rate of 10 per cent and India achieved an annual GDP growth rate of 6 per 
cent. As the nation with the largest population of 1.3 billion, China reached a nominal 
GDP of US$2.68 trillion and was the fourth largest economy in the world after the US, 
Japan, and Germany in 2006 (China Daily 2007). After China, India is the second-most 
populous nation with almost 1.1 billion people. It achieved US$0.92 billion of nominal 
GDP in 2006 and thus placed itself as the 12th largest economy in the world; but rose to 
the third largest when measured at purchasing power parity exchange rate (The 
Economist 2007). 
In today’s knowledge economy, innovation capability has been critical to national 
economic growth (Porter 1990; Nelson 1993). What has not been emphasized is the fact 
that this not only refers to developed countries and those who caught up earlier such as 
Japan, and the newly industrialized economies (NIEs), but also developing countries, 
such as China and India.  
Some have argued that China’s and India’s growth is due to advantages in the 
abundance of low-cost production factors such as labour and land, in addition to the 
foreign investment and technology resulting from the economic reforms that liberalized 
markets in China and India. This is similar to the ‘accumulation’ theory of growth held 
by a camp of scholars who contribute the high growth of NIEs, i.e., South Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, to high savings and investment, and argue that 
these factors have made it possible for the NIEs to better utilize the technology inherited 
from the world’s leaders in this field (Krugman 1994; Young 1995; Collins and 
Bosworth 1996). 
Some emphasize the role of technology progress in economic development and have 
documented how the transformation of national innovation systems and certain 
government technology policies have promoted indigenous R&D in China and India. 
(Liu and White 2001; Katrak 2002; Kumar and Jain 2002; Fan 2006a; Fan and 
Watanabe 2006; Motohashi and Yun 2007). This is an echo of the ‘assimilation’ theory, 
which asserts that the productivity growth resulting from the learning, entrepreneurship 
and innovation has been the critical source of NIEs’ growth (Dahlman 1994; Hobday 
1995; Kim 1998). 
In this paper, I intend to investigate how innovation capability has become the critical 
driving force for economic development in China and India. To achieve this objective, I 
first assess in section 2 the contribution of technology progress to economic 
development for both countries from 1981 to 2004. Then section 3 analyses the policy 
measures behind the numbers, with a focus on the transformation of the national 
innovation systems in China and India. In Section 4, using an example from the biotech 
industry, I examine at the micro level how vital has innovation capacity been to the 
growth of domestic companies and the main challenges faced by these in developing 
innovation capabilities; section 5 concludes. 
With a combined population of 2.4 billion, economic growth in China and India has 
profound meaning for the rest of the world. If they can repeat the growth miracle of the 
NIEs, the much smaller economies in East Asia, not only can China and India eradicate 2 
a large proportion of the world’s poverty, but they can also provide great policy 
implications for other developing countries. Despite differences in growth rate, growth 
pattern, and fast growing sectors, China and India share similarities in terms of their 
large population base and economic growth since the 1980s. Moreover, they both 
experienced the transition from planned economy to market-oriented economy. Both 
governments are committed to economic growth as well as to promoting indigenous 
capability. In this paper, I focus on the innovation capability perspective in order to 
provide insights for policymakers wanting to use innovation capability, particularly that 
originating in the developing countries, as the instrument for economic growth. It is 
hoped that more developing countries can benefit from the experience of China and 
India, as well as from the growth process of the well-studied NIEs.  
2  Contribution of technology progress to economic development 
2.1  Economic development of China and India 
Since the independence of China and India, both in the 1940s, these countries have 
utilized new ideologies to foster their growth: communism in China and Fabian 
socialism in India (Lal 1995). Shortly after the establishment of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949, the country adopted a socialist heavy-industry development strategy. 
The government took control of a large part of the economy and set up new industries, 
and it would appear that China grew faster than India until the end of 1970s (Lal 1995). 
For instance, according to World Bank data (2006), China’s GDP per capita growth rate 
reached 2.9 per cent per annum during the years 1960-80, despite the disruption of the 
Great Culture Revolution. China’s explosive economic growth took off after economic 
reform was launched in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping.  
Figure 1 
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Source:  World Bank (2006). 3 
Following the successful reform of the agriculture sector with the dismantling the 
communes and the introduction of the household responsibility system at the end of 
1970s, the government encouraged other types of activities such as setting up township 
and village enterprises (TVEs), facilitated foreign direct investment, and enhanced the 
link to the world economy through trade and import of foreign technologies. The 
government formally announced in 1993 that the goal of the reform was to establish a 
socialist market economy and to set up special economic zones (SEZs). Triggered by 
this and the foreign capital it attracted as well as other policy measures, the economy 
experienced a second surge in the early 1990s. In 2001, China’s membership in the 
WTO spurred another large inflow of foreign capital in subsequent years. Overall, 
annual GDP per capita growth rate was at a high 8.3 per cent from 1980 to 2005 
(Figure 1). 
After independence in 1947, Indian leaders introduced economic policies that were 
characterized by import substitution, industrialization, state intervention in labour and 
financial markets, a large public sector, business regulation and central planning. 
Nevertheless, India’s protectionism bordered rather on Fabian socialism and was less 
extreme than the Soviet style central-command system in China, as the regime involved 
both public and private sectors and was based on direct and indirect state intervention 
(Lal 1995). The low economic growth from 1947 to 1980, however, did not meet the 
expectations of the country’s leaders: annual growth rate of GDP per capita was a low 
1.1 per cent during 1960-80 (Figure 1). The high 3.7 per cent annual growth rate for 
GDP per capita for the period 1980-2005 can be attributed to two stages of reforms: the 
pro-business measure initiated by Rajiv Gandhi in 1980 and economic liberalization 
initiated in 1991 by Prime Minister P. V. Narashimha Rao and his finance minister, 
Manmohan Singh.  
2.2  The contribution of technology progress to economic growth  
Technology progress has contributed significantly to the expansion of GDP, especially 
in the 1990s, for both China and India (Figure 2). GDP growth rate is widely 
acknowledged as the indicator of the speed of economic development. China has 
enjoyed an annual GDP growth rate of 9.6 per cent since 1981, while India has achieved 
a corresponding figure of 5.6 per cent. GDP growth rate can be decomposed into three 
parts: the contributions of capital, labour, and technology, and the share of technology 
can be measured by total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate.1 Japan, for instance, 
had a very high TFP growth rate during its peak growth period during the decades of the 
1960s to the 1980s.  
Decomposing China and India’s GDP growth into the three factor contributions reveals 
that technology has significantly influenced both countries’ economic development in 
the 1990s. However, from 2001 to 2004, the contribution from technology progress to 
India’s economic development diminished to a marginal position.  
At the beginning of China’s reform era (1981-85), capital was the leading factor for 
growth, influencing GDP growth at 4.5 per cent annually, while technology promoted  
 
                                                 
1   For a detailed explanation on the TFP calculations, refer to Fan and Watanabe (2006). 4 
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Source:  Computed by the author based on World Bank (2006) data. 
GDP growth by 3.9 per cent per annum. However, from 1986 to 2000, technology 
progress became the leading production factor, contributing to half of the GDP growth. 
In 2001-04, although a large injection of capital triggered a 9.8 per cent growth in GDP, 
the share of technological progress to GDP nevertheless was still 3.8 per cent per 
annum. It should also be noted that labour’s contribution to growth has decreased over 
time. The share of capital was the lowest during 1996-2000, corresponding to the 
outbreak of the Asian financial crisis of that period.  
At the start of the reform era (1981-85) in India, capital, labour, and technology 
contributed to economic growth in a descending order, as indicated by their GDP 
growth rate contributions of 2.5 per cent, 1.5 per cent, and 1.4 per cent, respectively. 
However, similarly to China, the leading contributor to GDP growth was technology 
from 1986 to 2000, except for the years 1991-95 when technology was slightly behind 
that of capital. But from 2001 to 2004, the contribution from technology progress 
dropped to a marginal position, as its share in GDP growth was only 1.5 per cent 
annually. This was a sharp contrast to the contribution of capital that caused the 3.5 per 
cent GDP growth rate per annum. Unlike China, labour has a quite important role to 
play in India’s economic growth, as it consistently caused GDP to grow from 1.2 per 
cent to 1.5 per cent.  
2.3  Export of knowledge products and patent 
High-tech export—being a direct indicator of the economic benefit derived from 
technology progress in the global market—is appropriate for measuring China and 
India’s knowledge economy. In 1992 high-tech exports accounted for 5 per cent of the 
country’s overall exports and less than 1 per cent of GDP. By 2004, revenue from high-5 
tech exports had reached US$163 billion and accounted for over 25 per cent and 8.4 per 
cent of total exports and GDP, respectively (World Bank 2006). According to Wu Yi, 
China’s Vice Premier, the country’s policy of ‘enhancing trade by relying on science 
and technology’ had led to the rapid expansion of exports (Asia News 2004). In contrast 
to China’s impressive high-tech exports, India increased its exports in this field from 0.1 
per cent of GDP in 1988 to only 0.4 per cent in 2005 (World Bank 2006). However, if 
we take account the fact that software services, a strong sector in India, were not 
considered as high-tech exports but rather as service exports, performance is also 
impressive: service exports grew from 0.9 per cent of GDP in 1975 to 3.9 per cent of 
GDP in 2004, a pace much faster than China. Figure 3 indicates that China outperforms 
in manufacturing while India excels in service.  
The number of granted patents is an important indicator of a nation’s innovation 
capability. Because the registration of patents from different offices such as China’s and 
India’s are not comparable in terms of approval requirements, using US patent data can 
provide some base line for comparison. During 1970-99, inventors based in China and  
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Table 1 
US patents granted to Asian inventors, 1970-99 
Recipient countries  1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 Total  1970-99
Taiwan  1 176 397  1,772  5,271  12,366  19,983 
South  Korea  24 43 91  424  2,890  11,366  14,838 
Hong  Kong  59  75 113 177 279 570 1,273 
Singapore  21  9 20 47  148  499  744 
China  61  2  7 129 239 332  770 
India  83 67 40 64  126  316  696 
Source: Adapted from (Mahmood and Singh 2003: 1034). 6 
India were granted 770 and 696 patents, respectively, by the US Patent Office. Though 
the number of approvals is still far behind Taiwan and South Korea, they are quite 
comparable to Hong Kong and Singapore (Table 1). Forty-four of the 50 top patent 
winners in China represent domestic firms or organizations, while about 30 out of 
India’s 50 top patent winners are foreign multinationals or organizations (Mahmood and 
Singh 2003). However, the situation seems to be improving, as only15 per cent of 
patents during 1990-2001 went to foreign affiliates located in India (Mani 2004). 
Table 1 indicates the trend in patent activities for both countries.  
2.4 Knowledge  input 
It is widely acknowledged that financial investment and human resources in R&D are 
two important input factors for building up the innovation capability of a nation.  
China and India have invested heavily in R&D. This is true particularly for China since 
the mid-1990s; R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased from around 0.6 per 
cent in 1996 to 1.44 per cent in 2004. This is still behind the expenditures of the 
developed countries that spend on average 2-3 per cent of GDP on R&D. Nevertheless, 
China’s progress is impressive, considering that R&D expenditures increased even 
faster than its economy, which achieved an annual GDP growth rate of approximately 9-
10 per cent during the same period. Since 2003 China has had the third largest R&D 
expenditures (totalling US$108.9 million) after US (US$301.5 million) and Japan 
(US$119.8 million) (China Net 2003). According to OECD, China surpassed Japan in 
2006 and became the second largest nation in R&D expenditure with US$136 billion 
(China Gate 2006) (Figure 4) 
In 1990 India spent around 0.7 per cent of its GDP on R&D; in 2004, the figure was 
0.69 per cent. This means that India’s R&D has expenditure increased at the same pace 
as its economy, which has enjoyed a high annual GDP growth rate of 5.9 per cent since 
1980. For instance, during the year 2004-05 India spent US$5.38 billion (Figure 4).  
It is worth mentioning that the contributions of the business sector to R&D expenditure 
are drastically different in China and India. Over 60 per cent of China’s R&D 
expenditure originates from business enterprises (R&D Magazine 2005). Enterprises 
contribution in India is only marginally: in 2003, over 70 per cent of the R&D 
expenditure was from central or state governments; enterprises accounted for a mere 25 
per cent (GoI 2006). 
Both China and India lead in R&D human resources with respect to absolute numbers. 
However, in terms of R&D researchers per 1,000 people, China (7.08) and India are 
both below 10 and in a lower category in comparison to OECD countries and other 
NIEs such as South Korea and Singapore or the emerging economies of Brazil, Cuba, 
Hungary, Philippines and Russian Federation (Figure 5). 
Nevertheless, the large population bases of these countries imply that China and India 
have an advantage in R&D human resources. In fact, the attraction of a rich reserve of 
R&D human resources has encouraged multinational corporations to locate their 
corporate research centres in both countries. According to China’s National Research 
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Figure 4B 
India’s R&D expenditure and its percentage of GDP 
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Centre for Science and Technology for Development, by 2005 more than 600 
multinational corporations, including Motorola, Siemens, IBM, Intel, General Electric 
and Nokia, had established R&D laboratories in China (EDS 2005). Although most of 
the R&D is, in fact, development to tailor products to the needs of the Chinese market, 
there is some work on the more basic R&D, such as the Microsoft Research Centre set 
up in 1998 to take advantage of the China’s R&D skilled labour. According to 
Richard F. Rashid, the senior vice president of Microsoft Research, ‘China was really 
the No. 1 target from the beginning. We felt there was a tremendously deep pool of 
talent’ (The New York Times 2004). Similarly, many multinationals have set up R&D 
laboratories in India, as for example, General Electric in the John. F. Welch Technology 
Centre in Bangalore, which in 2000 was their largest single R&D location outside the 
US. The ultimate reason for the relocation of multinationals to India and China is the 
high return on R&D investment, realized through the skilled R&D workers. Mr Welch, 
the then chief operating officer of General Electric, commented ‘India is a developing 
country, but it is developed country as far as its intellectual infrastructure is concerned. 
We get the highest intellectual capital per dollar here’ (Tripathi 2007). 
3  The role of the government 
3.1  China  
Transforming national innovation system (NIS) 
In parallel with the economic reform, the Chinese government has been actively 
involved in setting up technology policies for industrial development since the 1980s. 
The first step was reforming the Soviet model for innovation system that China had 
applied since the 1950s. China’s national innovation system (NIS) prior to the 1980s 9 
had been characterized by the complete separation of science and technology (S&T) 
activities in public research institutes and manufacturing activities at state-owned 
enterprises (Xue 1997). The NIS reform focused on the integration of these two sectors 
by expanding the functions of each, i.e., introducing proper systems of innovation for 
both the science and industrial sectors (Liu and White 2001).  
The Chinese government pushed the R&D institutes to adapt to the market environment 
and to become more involved with R&D that had industrial implications. To initiate the 
process, the government reduced institutional funding for public research institutes 
(PRIs) and universities (Motohashi and Yun 2007). The government also undertook a 
three-step procedure: (i) advocating in 1987 the merger of some R&D institutes with 
enterprises; (ii) offering as of 1988 encouragement and financial incentives for the 
commercialization of R&D results, especially through the Torch Programme; and 
(iii) starting in the 1990s to reform the established R&D institutes into entities that, as 
production and consultancy centres, could also incorporate economic functions 
(Gu 1999; Fan 2006a; Fan and Watanabe 2006).  
On the other hand, enterprises, not only state-owned enterprises, but also multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and new tech enterprises, became involved in the NIS and started 
to conduct more R&D. As a result, the business sector (large- and medium-sized 
enterprises) rose to become a major spender of national R&D, spending in 2001 for 
instance RMB 44 billion, an increase of RMB 14 billion from the 1995 level and 
accounting for 42 per cent of the national total (Fan and Watanabe 2006). According to 
the R&D Magazine (2005), in 2004 R&D spending by the industry sector accounted for 
61.2 per cent of the national total.  
Nevertheless, it has to be realized that China’s road to reform was not smooth. The 
initial NIS reform policy, merging R&D institutes with existing enterprises, was a 
failure because of the lack of financial resources from the enterprises supporting the 
R&D institutes and the mismatch between the technology development needs of the 
enterprises and the research institutes (Fan and Watanabe 2006). 
Development of technology policy initiatives 
In conjunction with transforming the NIS, the government also put in place a series of 
technology policy initiatives. Among the principal components are Key Technologies 
Research and Development Programme, High-tech Research and Development 
Programme (Programme 863), and the National Programme for Priority Basic Research 
and Development (Programme 973) (Table 2). 
China’s first and largest scientific and technological plan in the reform era was the Key 
Technologies Research and Development Programme, initiated in 1982. The aim of the 
programme was to find solutions to key technological issues related to national 
economic and social development, covering the fields of agriculture, electronic 
information, energy resources, transportation, materials, resource exploration, 
environmental protection, medical and health care, etc. Tens of thousands of individuals 
from more than thousand scientific research institutes nationwide participated in the 
programme, making it the largest national S&T plan with respect to funds invested and 
personnel (China Net 2007). 
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Table 2 
Major technology policy initiatives in China since the reform 
Year Policy  initiative 
1982  – Key Technologies Research and Development Programme 
1986  – High-tech Research and Development Programme (Programme 863) 
1988  – Torch Programme 
1991  – The first high-tech park (Zhongguancun High-tech Park) was established 
1990  – First group of 27 high-tech parks was set up. 
1995  – Decision on accelerating S&T development was announced by the State Council 
1997  – National Programme for Priority Basic Research and Development ( Programme 973) 
Source:   Compiled by the author. 
The objective of High-tech Research and Development Plan or Programme 863 was to 
promote high-quality fundamental research in China with a specific focus on eight areas 
(biotechnology, aero-space, information, laser, automation, energy resources, new 
materials and oceanology) and 20 subjects that were critical to the country’s technology 
and industrial development. Experienced scientists and researchers are selected for the 
project and the participation of domestic firms is also welcomed. The rationale of plan 
863 is that this basic research is critical for China’s national technological 
competitiveness, but too costly to conduct at individual research units or firms (GoC 
2007a). 
Complementary to the previous two programmes which focus on fundamental research, 
the Torch Programme was initiated in 1988 to facilitate market-oriented technological 
development and commercialization of technology. It is the most important high-tech 
industrial development plan in China The Torch Programme’s objectives include 
(i) developing a favourable environment for high-tech industry; (ii) setting up high-tech 
zones and start-up service centres for high-tech businesses; (iii) executing industrial 
projects in areas identified by Plan 863; (iv) facilitating international cooperation of 
Chinese high-tech firms; and (v) training high-quality human capital (GoC 2007b).  
One particular goal of the Torch Programme was to set up high-tech parks specializing 
in high-tech innovation, application, and diffusion to attract foreign high-tech 
multinational corporations and to encourage the development of domestic innovative 
companies. Since the establishment of Zhongguancun Science Park in May 1988, high-
tech parks designated by the national government have developed into major locations 
for the country’s high-tech industries. By 2003, China had about 33,392 high-tech 
enterprises, with 67 per cent of these located in high-tech parks. The average annual 
growth rate of the number of firms, their total employment, total revenue, and export 
value from 1991 to 2004 reached 25 per cent, 31 per cent, 41 per cent and 52 per cent, 
respectively (Fan 2006b) 
On 5 May 1995, the state council announced the ‘Decision on Accelerating S&T 
Development’ which outlined plans for China’s scientific and technology development 
for the next several decades and emphasized that S&T research should be closely linked 
to the market. One ambitious goal of the Decision was to increase by 2000 China was 
spending on R&D to 1.5 per cent of GDP when at the time the corresponding figure was 
only 0.6 per cent of GDP. China’s R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP has grown 
at a faster pace after1995 than in previous years and reached 1.44 per cent in 2006. The 
significant contribution of technological progress to economic growth in the second half 11 
of the 1990s is obviously closely related to the country’s determination to develop its 
innovation capability.  
In June 1997, the Chinese government approved the National Programme for Priority 
Basic Research and Development (Programme 973) to strengthen indigenous innovation 
and to target innovation related to sustainable development to such areas as agriculture, 
energy, information, resources and environment, population and health and materials. 
The programme involved two development strategies: to ‘rejuvenate the country 
through science and technology’ and ‘sustainable development’ (GoC 2007c). The four 
main tasks of the programme include: (i) conducting multi-disciplinary integrated 
research and providing theoretic and scientific foundation for important scientific issues 
in the fields listed above; (ii) deploying relevant, important and explorative forefront 
basic research; (iii) nurturing highly qualified human resources in scientific fields; and 
(iv) setting up a number of high-level national research bases and multi-disciplinary 
research centres.  
Based on earlier reforms of the innovation system, China’s fifteenth 5-year plan 
(2001-05) further articulated its central theme in the new millennium—economic 
development driven by technological progress, once again, emphasizing that innovation 
activities are to be further promoted.  
3.2 India 
The government of India has always promoted the development of indigenous 
technologies. It built up an extensive network of science and technology institutions, 
and granted tax incentives for the R&D efforts of enterprises. Recently, programmes 
have been organized on technology management to advise enterprises on technology 
forecasting and assessment as well as market evaluation (Katrak 2002). 
Transforming NIS 
Similarly to China, the Indian government has taken a series of steps to modernize its 
NIS, starting from the 1980s when economic reform took place. India had a highly 
restrictive regime until the mid-1980s, characterized by protection of its domestic firms 
from both international and internal competitions. Strict industrial licensing for the 
entry, expansion, and diversification of firms regulated internal competition among 
domestic firms, while restricted entry and expansion of foreign companies regulated 
competition between domestic and foreign companies. High tariff rates, import 
licensing, and quota restrictions protected domestic firms from international competition 
(Aggarwal 2000) 
Deregulation was initiated in the mid-1980s in order to reform the old regime. 
Abolishment of industrial licensing in a number of industries and trade liberalization2 
increased competition between firms, domestically and internationally. Other important 
initiatives included exchange rate adjustment by allowing the depreciation of rupee and 
liberalizing foreign capital and important technologies. The restrictions on technology 
                                                 
2   Trade liberalization measures include reduction in tariff rates, rationalization of tariff structure, 
relaxation in import licensing requirement, and deregulation of imports of raw materials, components 
and capital goods (Aggarwal 2000).  12 
imports were relaxed substantially through measures such as the mitigation of sectoral 
restrictions on technology imports, substantial tax cuts on royalties and technical fees, 
simplification of tax structure, and deregulation of imports of drawings and designs 
(Aggarwal 2000; Katrak 2002) 
In tandem with the change to a more liberalized regime, one dimension of India’s NIS 
transformation was the reform of its industrial research institutes (IRIs), which had been 
set up by the government to promote indigenous technological knowhow and to help 
enterprises introduce new products and procedures. Even though the economic rational 
had been to gap the bridge caused by ‘market failure’,3 India’s IRIs performed poorly in 
the face of problems relating to finance, uncertainty and other issues. Furthermore, user 
enterprises lacked the capability to assimilate with the technology of the IRIs. Another 
contributing factor to the poor performance of the IRIs could have been their 
institutional arrangement, which may have been affected with an ‘ivory tower’ attitude: 
scientists, engineers and technologists concentrated on technological projects which 
would bring them peer recognition but which had only limited commercial use. In 
addition, the IRIs have become ineffective because of inefficient use of resources 
(Katrak 1998)  
The government ended the traditional R&D policy according to which subsidies and 
grants for R&D were the principal public support mechanism. National laboratories of 
the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and other prestigious technical 
institutes were instructed to earn at least 30-50 per cent of their R&D expenditures 
through the commercialization of indigenously developed technologies and the 
generation and utilization of patents (Sikka 1998). The 1997-98 budget proposed that 
R&D institutions recognized by the Department of Science and Technology be allowed 
to retain equity holdings in the private enterprises that used their technology (Katrak 
1998).  
Development of technology policies 
Indian government has a long history of encouraging technology development. Before 
reform, the focus was on creating a strong technological infrastructure and providing 
human resources to research communities and industries. By 1998, India had about 
3,000 scientific institutions, with 2,000 devoted to R&D (including in-house research 
and development units of industrial sector, academic institutions, test laboratories and 
technology centres) (Kumar and Jain 2003). The first key initiative was the Scientific 
Policy Resolution enacted in 1958 to support early and critical stages of 
industrialization. The next milestone was the Indian Patents Act of 1970, which granted 
patents for the specific processes of products rather than the products themselves. The 
Act created the opportunity for Indian firms to adapt reverse engineering for optimal 
processes and thus boosted their R&D capability. The Act was amended in 1999 and 
subsequently made TRIPS4 compliant in 2003 (Mani 2004). 
                                                 
3   Enterprises, especially small- and medium-sized ones, may not have sufficient financial resources to 
cover the large costs involved in technological efforts; they may also be discouraged by the 
uncertainty; and they may not be able to fully capture the benefits of the R&D efforts (Katrak 1998). 
4   TRIPS is the acronym for Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, an 
international agreement administrated by World Trade Organization (WTO).  13 
One important moderation was the provision of venture capital funds. The Technology 
Policy Statement (1983), Research and Development Cess Act (1986), and Technology 
Development Board Act (1995) were enacted to provide risk-sharing funds and 
managerial expertise for technology development and commercialization. The 
Technology Policy Statement (TPS) of 1983 was a new initiative in the reform era, 
aiming at increasing technological competence and self-reliance in strategic areas. 
While special emphasis is given to indigenous technology, the TPS also advocates a mix 
of indigenous and imported technology (Kumar and Jain 2002). 
The Research and Development (R&D) Cess Act of 1986 established a fund for the 
import of technologies, to finance development of indigenous technologies, and to make 
imported technologies indigenous. In addition to the R&D Cess Act, some resources are 
also provided through venture capital funds and a few other schemes, such as the 
Technology Information and Forecasting Assessment Council (TIFAC) established in 
1988 under the Home Grown Technology scheme. The autonomous body of the 
government of India also provides some financing and facilitates the development and 
commercialization of technologies. The Technology Development Board Act (1995) 
was another policy initiative in that direction (Kumar and Jain 2002). 
Other schemes to facilitate and promote technology testing, up-scaling, and 
commercialization include the Programme Aimed at Technological Self-Reliance, The 
Sponsored Research and Developments Scheme, and the Programme for Acceleration 
of Commercial Energy Research, etc. (Kumar and Jain 2003).  
The government announced a new S&T policy in 2003 which ambitiously set the goal 
of R&D spending at 2 per cent of GDP by March 2007. The policy articulated eleven 
strategies for achieving the objective and, compared to its predecessors, the policy also 
had four new features: (i) it recognized that India has a large pool of scientists and 
engineers, but a low density; (ii) it acknowledged the necessity of managing the 
braindrain from the country; (iii) it highlighted the trend of increasing patenting both at 
home and abroad, and (iv) it noted the need to monitor implementation of the policy. 
Despite the aggressive goal, the feasibility of implementing the policy has been 
questioned (Mani 2004). 
Table 3 
Major technology policy initiatives in India 
Year Policy  initiative 
1958  –  Scientific Policy Resolution 
1970 –  Indian  Patent  Act 
1983  –  Technology Policy Statement
 (new draft announced in 1993, but not adopted) 
1986  –  Research and Development Cess Act 
1988  –  Announcement of the Venture Capital Guidelines 
1995  –  Technology Development Board Act 
1996  –  Announcement of CSIR 2001: Vision and Strategy 
–  Securities and Exchange Board of India (Venture Capital Funds) Regulations 1996 
(replacing the 1988 Venture Capital Guidelines) 
1999  –  Amendment of the Indian Patents Act 1970  
2000  –  Announcement of New Millennium Indian Technology Leadership  
2003  –  New S&T Policy  
Source: Mani  (2004). 14 
4  Innovation capability development of domestic companies 
Biotech industry, along with information technology, can be an appropriate field for 
examining the relationship between the innovation capability and economic growth of a 
nation. Constituting one of the three essential technologies of the knowledge economy 
(information technology, biotechnology and nano technology), the biotech industry and 
its revenue have grown rapidly, reaching US$60 billion in 2006, or ten times its 1996 
level (Nature Biotechnology 2006). The innovation intensity of the biotech industry is 
reflected in the fact that it is one of the most R&D intensive industries. In 2002, global 
leaders of the biotech industry spent an average of more than 20 per cent of their 
revenue on R&D, whereas computer hardware and software fields spent, on average, 
less than 10 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively (MIT 2003). Corresponding to heavy 
investment, biotechnology is also one of the innovative-intensive emerging industries.  
Similarly to their success in the ICT industry (China focusing on ICT hardware and 
India on ICT software), these two giants have within short timespan successfully proven 
themselves as world players in the biotech industry. Over the 2000-05 period China 
achieved within this specialized field an annual growth rate of 30 per cent, while India 
achieved a growth rate of 36 per cent during 2005-06 (Jia 2006c; Biospectrum 2006a). 
In 2006, China and India ranked in 9th position and 11th position, respectively, in 
biotech revenue (Buckley et al. 2006).  
It is worth mentioning that innovative domestic companies are essential for the 
expansion of the biotech industry in both countries. During 2005-06, 14 of India’s top 
20 biotech firms were ‘home-grown’ and all top six companies domestic. Moreover, 
India is quite advanced in globalizing their revenue; the country’s biotech industry 
obtained more than 50 per cent of its revenue from the international market during the 
same period (Biospectrum 2006a) 
4.1  Selected domestic companies and their innovation capability 
Based on my research of biopharmaceutical industries in China and India, I have 
selected three companies from each country to illustrate the importance of innovation 
capability in the development of domestic companies.  
The three selected Chinese companies were established in the late 1990s and are located 
on the east coast (Table 4A). SiBiono became the first company in the world to produce 
a license gene therapy drug in 2003. The gene therapy, recombinant Ad-p53 anti-cancer 
injection, is registered under the brand name Gendicine, targets squamous cell 
carcinoma (HNSCC) of the head and neck. Sunway’s H100 Series targets the same 
disease. Currently, HNSCC is the second most common type of cancer in China, with 
about 2.5 million new patients every year, accounting for 10 per cent of all cancer 
patients. MedGenn’s main innovation is Endostar, recombinant human endostatin for 
non-small cell lung cancer (China Daily 2004; Jia 2006a). 
The three innovative Indian domestic firms—Shantha Biotechnics, Bharat Biotech 
International, and Jupiter Biotechnology—are all located in Hyderabad, the bio-valley 
of India. Shantha Biotechnics and Bharat Biotech International are acknowledged as 
dedicated and innovative biopharmaceutical startup companies that have managed to 
gain significant success and recognition (Frew et al. 2007). As Table 4 illustrates, 15 
innovation capability of the Indian firms is primarily demonstrated by a large number of 
their own brands of recombinant products. For instance, Shantha was the first in India to 
develop the r-DNA hepatitis B vaccine, followed by Bharat and others. Both Shantha 
and Bharat have a range of recombinant products based on their own innovations. 
Jupiter, on the other hand, is the leading world producer in drug intermediates.  
Examination of domestic medical biotech companies indicates that India has currently 
outperformed China in terms of quantity, scale of manufacturing, and globalization. 
Apparently firms in these two countries have very different development paths. 
Domestic companies in India started with products that were already produced by 
multinational corporations and began to build manufacturing parallels, thus improving 
their R&D capability. Chinese companies, on the other hand, collected ideas dropped by 
the US start-up companies and leapfrogged to first position in the sector. Despite the 
differences, both governments have provided crucial stimuli to starting-up these 
innovative companies.  
Table 4 
Innovative domestic medical biotech companies in China and India  
Company Established  Location  Main  innovations 
CHINA 
Shenzhen SiBiono GeneTech 
Co. Ltd (SiBiono) 
1998 
 
Shenzhen  Gendicine (recombinant adenovirus type 5 gene 
therapy carry human p53 gene) for head and neck 
cancer squamous–cell carcinoma: first gene therapy 
in the world 






Endostar (recombinant human endostatin) for non-
small cell lung cancer 
 
Originally developed by Entremed until 2003, 
endostar has an additional 9-amino acid sequence at 
N terminus 
Shanghai Sunway Biotech 
Co. Ltd (Sunway) 
1995 
 
Shanghai  H 100 Series 
 
H101: (recombinant oncolytic adenovirus type 5) for 
head and neck cancer squamous–cell carcinoma 
 
H101: a modified version of Onyx-015 
Note: originally developed by Onyx Pharm. and later 
abandoned 
INDIA 
Shantha Biotechnics  1993 
 
Hyderabad  r-DNA hepatitis B vaccine (first in India), 
erythropoietin, streptokinase, oncology segment 
 
More than half of revenue from exports 
Bharat Biotech International  1996 
 
Hyderabad  r-DNA hepatitis B vaccine, streptokinase (first in 
India), typhoid vaccine, vaccines for malaria and 
rotavirus infection. 
 
More than half of revenue from exports 
Jupiter Bioscience Limited  1985 
 
Hyderabad  Leading player in drug intermediates, especially 
peptide, one of the top 5 global players (only one in 
Asia) 
 
Most revenue come from exports 
Sources: Jia (2006a) for China; compiled by author for India. 16 
4.2 Innovation  capability 
The findings of domestic biotech firms in terms of innovation capability can be 
summarized as following:  
First, innovation capability has become more and more vital to the success of the 
Chinese and Indian biotech firms. Successful firms introduced branded products to the 
market through their innovation, as illustrated in Table 4. By 2006, the Indian 
government had approved 14 recombinant biotech products, seven of which were 
developed and are currently manufactured by Indian firms: hepatitis B vaccine, 
streptokinase, human insulin, granulocyte colony stimulating factor (G-CSF), 
erythropoietin, human growth hormone and interferon alpha 2b (DBT 2006b). Further, 
faced with declining profits (price wars), traditional pharmaceutical firms are looking 
into innovation as an alternative. For instance, India’s pharmaceutical companies have 
entered the bio-drug field, such as Biocon and Dr Reddy’s. China lags behind India in 
this issue, and traditional pharmaceutical companies need to seek for options to 
overcome their present predicament, for example, through the purchase of small 
innovative biotech companies.  
Second, institutional factors have great influence over the choice of innovation at the 
firm level, i.e., the decision at firm level in terms of indigenous R&D or the import of 
technology. The change in the intellectual property (IP) regime has provided a certain 
push for the domestic firms to move towards indigenous R&D. With the 
implementation of WTO-GATT Agreement in 2005, the Indian firms’ conventional 
manufacturing procedures based reverse engineering are being challenged because they 
are effectively barred from replicating innovations patented in the western world (Mani 
2004). On the other hand, India has become a signatory to the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty, administered by the WIPO, making it easier for India to file a patent protecting 
IP rights. Similarly, China’s membership in the WTO and signing of the TRIPS imply 
that the country needs more indigenous R&D than innovations based on duplication or 
reverse-engineered versions of western patents. Further, the push by both governments 
has provided incentives and encouraged domestic companies to innovate, as 
exemplified by India’s department of biotechnology established in 1986 to provide a 
better environment for biotech development, technology transfer between research 
institutes and private companies, etc. On the other hand, China’s National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) provides financial guidelines. For instance, the 
Guideline on Pharmaceutical Industry Development for the 11th Five-Year Period 
(2006-2010) released on 4 September 2006 proposed that both public and private money 
earmarked for pharmaceutical R&D be increased from the current 1 per cent to 3 per 
cent of revenue from pharmaceutical sales by the end of 2010. In anticipation that large 
pharmaceutical groups would invest in biotech research, the guideline also outlined 
greater pricing leeway to producers of innovative drugs, whereas the NDRC had earlier 
forced pharmaceutical firms to slash their prices (DBT 2006a; Jia 2006b, 2006c) 
Nevertheless, two major challenges face both China and India in the development of 
innovation capability through biotech industry: financial and human resources 
constraints.  
Limited financial resources have become the bottleneck in both countries in the 
development of biotech industry. Currently, government support has been the main 
avenue of financing domestic firms in China and India, especially for start up firms, 17 
although Indian firms are more advanced in manufacturing and are thus able to channel 
a quite significant portion of the revenue back to R&D. For instance, the three Chinese 
firms selected for this study relied heavily on financial support from the government. 
Even though venture capital (VC) or private equity (PE) is increasingly an option, their 
contribution is quite insignificant in both countries. In China biotech VCs are mainly 
created by governments and strict regulations discourage international VCs from 
entering the market. Nevertheless, other financing alternatives should be examined. 
Indian domestic companies have actively sought international funding sources, ranging 
from venture capital, to international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
IMF, and to philanthropic organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 
(Biospectrum 2006b, 2006c). 
The second major hindrance to the biotech industry of the two giants relates to mediocre 
qualifications of human resources. Even though both countries have a good education 
infrastructure and a large pool of low-cost scientists, university education cannot meet 
the standards of the industry. To rectify the situation, India’s DBT’s human resource 
plan has proposed various approaches for a quick fix of qualified biotech graduates, 
post-graduate doctors, and scientists (DBT 2006a). China, compared to India, needs in 
particular manufacturing technicians (Jia 2007). Both countries are looking to attracting 
expatriates from overseas into high-level elite positions in the hope of repeating 
Taiwan’s success story in the electronics industry.  
5 Conclusion 
Both China and India, as the emerging giants in Asia, have achieved significant 
economic development in recent years. China has enjoyed a high annual GDP growth 
rate of 10 per cent and India has achieved an annual GDP growth rate of 6 per cent since 
1981. As innovation capability is vital in the development of today’s knowledge 
economy, I have evaluated its contribution to economic growth in China and India.  
Decomposing China and India’s GDP growth from 1981 to 2004 into the contribution 
of the three factors reveals that technology has contributed significantly to both 
countries’ GDP’s growth, especially in the 1990s. However, from 2001-04, the 
contribution from technology progress to economic development in India diminished to 
a marginal position. Rapid growth of high-tech exports, service exports, and certified 
patents from United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) further attest to the 
fact that the innovation systems in both countries have, over the reform years, increased 
their output efficiency. It should also be noted that the countries invested heavily in 
knowledge inputs such as R&D expenditures and R&D human resources, particularly 
China with respect to R&D expenditure. The business sector’s increased share in R&D 
expenditures indicates that enterprises have become the main actor in R&D in China, 
whereas India’s R&D is still dominated by public research institutes.  
Both governments have played an essential role in transforming their national 
innovation systems to become more adaptable to economic development, and one of 
main focus of R&D reforms was to integrate the science and business sectors and to 
provide incentives for innovation activities. Balancing the import of technology with 
indigenous R&D effort was another major theme.  18 
Finally, the paper concludes with a review of the development of the biotech industry in 
both countries, with special focus on the progress of innovation capability of domestic 
firms—a factor that is becoming more and more critical to the success of the Indian and 
Chinese biotech firms. Institutional factors have great influence over the choice of 
innovation at the firm level, i.e., the decision at firm level in terms of indigenous R&D 
or the import of technology. But limited financial resources and the mediocre human 
resource qualifications remain two major challenges for domestic companies in both 
China and India.  
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